The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

During my twenty years in the Middle East, Palestinian clashes were often blamed on Britain's Balfour Declaration, which, in 1917, recommended a Palestinian homeland for Jewish people. Against the bloody backdrop of World War I, this book details the chronology of the perceptions and secret negotiations of British, French, Arab, and Jewish leaders and diplomats. This process culminates with the Balfour Declaration, and later, the post-war Allied occupations of the Middle East.As early as 1845, twelve thousand Jews lived in Palestine, a part of the Ottoman Empire since 1517. Most had traveled alone to die in the holy land. In 1881, after the assassination of Russia's Tsar Alexander II, his son Alexander III reimposed anti-Semitic policies, leading to mass Jewish emigrations to Palestine, some thirty thousand in twenty years. When their established agricultural colonies floundered, rich Jewish philanthropists of London and Paris funded, not only land purchases, but also schools, doctors, tools, etc. By 1914, 85,000 Jews made up one-ninth of the Palestinian population, and they owned 130,000 acres.Signed treaties represent various schemes for dividing up the Middle Eastern Ottoman Empire after the Great War, of course, assuming an Allied victory. The first treaty, of November 1915, is between grand sharif, Hussein of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner of Egypt. Sharif Hussein promises an Arab revolt against the Ottoman occupiers, thereby helping the Allied war effort. In return, he wants to head a caliphate comprising "Arabia." McMahon assumes "Arabia" means the Arabian Peninsula, at most, while Hussein envisions all Middle Eastern lands of the Ottomans, including Palestine.This is a recurring theme in Schneer's expert documentation, where diplomats often intentionally left borders ambiguous, in order to achieve mutual acceptance of other provisions.Also, in 1915, Sir Mark Sykes, sixth baronet of Sledmere, a dynamic British imperialist diplomat, who desires to fortify the British empire, meets with a Frenchman, Francoise Georges-Picot, first secretary of the French Embassy in London. Their Sykes-Picot Agreement divides the Levant into areas controlled by the French (northwest) and the British (southeast), plus the disputed Palestinian territory is "governed by an international condominium." In March 1916, Sykes and Picot arrive in Russia where they promise the Russians control of Constantinople while the Russians accept the division of the Middle East established in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, thus creating the new Tripartite Agreement.Next, two powerful forces, both harboring questionable assumptions, slowly converge. In Britain, Chaim Weizmann, the charismatic leader of the World Zionist Federation, presses influential British government figures for a separate Jewish state in Palestine over the objections of Jewish "assimilationist" organizations that prefer assimilation into existing countries. On the other side, high officials of the British government accede to Weizmann's request because they erroneously believe in a powerful "World Jewry," where British Jews could help fund their ongoing war, Turkish Jews could withdraw their support of the Ottomans, and American Jews could persuade America to enter the war.After realizing that the British plan to militarily drive the Turks from Palestine, Weisman meets with Sykes in February 1917, stating that Zionists want a British protectorate in Palestine in order to stabilize their Jewish homeland and to cope with the Arab population. Sykes appears to agree, though he had promised Palestine to others: The French and an "international condominium" in the Tripartite Agreement, and Sharif Hussein, who probably understood that "Arabia" included Palestine, in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.By May 1917, the Zionists, the French, and the Arabs each discover that other British treaties compromise their own, except Sharif Hussein never learns of British plans for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Sir Mark Sykes, the diplomat's diplomat, embarks on a tour of the Middle East and turns what should have been a mission of apologies into one of adjusting treaty terms to resolve all wording conflicts. Sykes informs Foreign Office superiors "The main difficulty was to maneuver the delegates into asking for what we were prepared to give them, without letting them know what precise geographical agreement had been come to."Also in 1917, British and Turkish government representatives secretly sue for a separate peace between the two countries, which Chaim Weisman and the Zionists try to defeat since any agreement would probably mean continued Middle East, including Palestine, occupation by the Ottomans. However, during final negotiations, the Turks win some battles and the Ottoman leader Enver Pasha withdraws, leaving Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, disappointed.On November 2, 1917 the Balfour Declaration, issued by Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, states "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. . . " At this time the British army moving up from Egypt, and Arab forces from Arabia, both battle the Ottomans as they push north toward Damascus. Schneer speculates on the possibility of the Arabs reaching Damascus before the British and before November 2, thus occupying Palestine and probably preventing the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. However, this was not in the cards. While Sharif Hussein's son Feisal, the Arab leader, rests his fighters in Aqaba, British General Allenby liberates Jerusalem on December 9, thus securing the future British Protectorate and the new Jewish homeland.

Israeli Statecraft: National Security Challenges and Responses (Besa Studies in International Security) This book is very good and in parts outstanding a describing of the history of the Balfour Declaration, correctly diagnosing that “The Balfour Declarationwas the highly contingent product of a tortuous process characterized as much be deceit and chance as by vision and diplomacy” (p. 369), though I think that “luck” should be more empathized.But the evaluation in the Conclusion chapter is wrong. The author blames the British for practicing deceit in the dealings with the Arabs and Zionists as well as the French, as indeed they did. But they were in the middle of the life-or-death World War against the Central Powers. They had no choice but to seek advantages wherever they could, playing multi-dimensional poker (chess, as used occasionally in the book as a metaphor, is misleading) hiding their cards and bluffing as best as they could.Even more misleading is the statement that “…the lead-up to the Balfour Declaration sowed dragon’s teeth" (p. 370), followed by “…growing from …mistrust a bitterness that would lead to the spilling of much blood (p. 374). This evaluation, as well as the subtitle of the book “the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict,” demonstrate total misunderstanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It seems to hint that if all had been done by public diplomacy Israel could have been established without protracted conflict with Arab actors. This is incorrect! The roots of the conflict are its zero-sum game nature with rule over Palestine at stake, aggravated by deep religious and cultural colliding meanings. Setting up the State of Israel without a lengthy and in part bloody clash with Arab states and non-state actors was intrinsically impossible, never mind how Great Britain went about issuing the Balfour Declaration.World War One did saw dragon’s teeth by putting all the blame for the war on Germany and imposing on it too harsh a peace, and later sitting by the side when Hitler rearmed. But this is another matter.Professor Yehezkel DrorThe Hebrew University of Jerusalem

This title states it is about the Balfour Declaration. Most books on the topic focus on the drafting history and maybe a little more on the drafters. This book looks at the entire historical context and the story culminating into what has become known as the Balf.Dec. It covers even the reactions of British Muslims and details the relations between Hussain and McMahon. Schneer writes well and made the read interesting by developing the story of two parallel histories (Jewish Zionists in the UK vs Arabs in Mekka) that suddenly collided in Jerusalem - partly due to BD. For some however it might be a "turn off" that Schneer got a Jewish Book Prize for this book. I am not qualified enough to see a bias. The book has a wealth of useful information. I would strongly recommend this book - particularly to young Jewish, Muslim and Palestine activists who are usually interested in the topic. It is a must read.

Well researched but overburdened by too much minute detail, making it a difficult reading experience. Gave up and re-read the Oxford Short Guide to the Arab -Israeli conflict. Needed a better editor.

This book is very thoroughly researched, and sets the Balfour Declaration in the broader context of British imperial ambitions in the Middle East during WW1. Read this, and you will understand why the declaration is (deliberately) ambiguous. Well worth the read.

Want to know why Gaza and the West Bank are the way they are? Read this. Yes, the Brits again Im afraid

A real mine of information.