Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

I consider myself a child of the 6 day war of 1967. I grew up in a non-religious Jewish family. We felt sympathy for Israel but it was a somewhat distant connection.On the Monday morning of June 5, in Rotterdam, when I arrived at school (I was 15) my class mates told me that there was war in "my" country. I always considered my country to be the Netherlands, but being told that Israel was my country, though at that time never having been there and only having felt a distant connection, it woke something up in me and I consider my Jewish self to be a child of the 6 day war. By now I have been close to 40 times in Israel and in fact we just came back 10 days ago.I remember the 6 day war very well and have read numerous books about it, but Michael Oren's book goes well beyond the headlines. It explains all the facts and history that lead to the conflict, including the inter-Arab distrust and conflicts that ultimately contributed to the Abraham Accords.Michael Oren's books reads easily and should be compulsory reading for the young Jewish generation that is often pro Israel but which does not know the history.

Michael Oren has written a captivating account of the diplomatic, political, and biographical circumstances around the war the Israelis call 'The Six Day War' and the Arabs know as 'The June War'. As the glowing reviews, on Amazon.Com and elsewhere suggest, this is a captivating, well researched book, that will almost certainly be known as a classic.After an introduction which traces the Israeli-Arab conflict to the 1960s, Oren starts unrolling the events that lead to the outbreak of the war - namely, the boarder clashes between Israel and Syria, the attacks by Palestinian Militants (or terrorists, or revolutionaries, take your pick), and the counter attacks (or raids, or Imperialistic demonstrations of power) by Israelis.The crisis took an escalation with the evacuation of the United Nation Emergency Force from Egypt, thus closing Israel's red sea port, and the movement of Egyptian forces into the Sinai desert.Oren's description of the political forces at work, going back and force from Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Moscow and Washington DC (with stops at Amman, Paris and the UN headquarters in New York City), is nothing short of masterful. He describes how internal power struggles within the Arab world and within Egypt moved Egypt towards a confrontation with Israel and the Unites States, and how political forces within Israel, as well as a wish to maintain close relationships with the US ruled Israeli political movements.I was struck by the major role U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations played in the conflict. By pulling the UN forces from the straits of Tiran that rapidly, Thant boosted Egyptian's pride. Had Thant stood up to Nasser, perhaps the war could have been evaded.Equally interesting is Oren's depiction of US President Johnson, heavily involved in the much criticized war in Vietnam, unable to give Israel the support that it asked for - and thus, in the eyes of the Israeli leadership, giving it the green light to strike.The attack, launched by Israeli airforce on the 5th of June 1967, caught the Egyptian unaware. Israeli operation Focus, the destruction of Egyptian air fields, was a resounding success. In a way, the war was already won.The greatest weakness of Oren's account is in the description of the military operation. Frankly, they were so confused, with hardly any maps, that I don't think you can understand much about the ground level events of the war, or about the military strategy at all the levels except the highest, unless you already know a great deal about it beforehand.This fault, however, does not really mar this otherwise excellent account, which goes on to describe the mix of responses in the Arab world, both desperation and euphoria (due to the phantasmagorial propaganda), the accusations that the US aided Israel (what Johnson called 'The Big Lie'), and the unfortunate attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli forces (Which Oren convincingly demonstrates was an accident).Most interesting, Oren describes the attempt to secure a cease-fire, and Israel's attempts to duck, delay and win time. After trying hard to avoid the war, Israeli leaders were unwilling to end it without a major change in the political landscape - the conquest of vast territories in the Sinai desert, the West Bank, and the Goal Heights.I was also amazed to read about the complete lack of strategic planning in the side of Israel. While military plans were finely drawn and perfectly executed, there was apparently no thought at all given to the goals of the war, beyond a somewhat naive wish to expand Israel's boarders and repay the Arab aggressors. Decisions such as weather to conquer East Jerusalem, to cross the tunnel, or to invade Syria, were done on the spur on the moment. Worse, they were often carried out not by the Government, but by the whims of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.This is perhaps the most extraordinary revelation I had while reading Oren's book - that Dayan, and virtually Dayan alone, decided almost all the important decisions of the war. Not Prime Minister Eshkol, not the Israeli government, and not the international community made the decisions. For better or worse, almost everything in the modern Middle East is the consequence of the solitary decisions of Moshe Dayan.Almost four decades later, in the middle of yet another wave of Israeli-Arab violence, I find that highly troubling, but strangely Ironic, and I fear that, in this regard at least, little has changed. In the event of an all out war, will the next forty or fifty years be decided by one charismatic leader in the Israeli cabinet?

Excellent read about the ‘67 war with an updated perspective. Good narrative decades after the war that includes both Arab as well as Israeli viewpoints

At first I was skeptical about this book. It's hard enough to get a balanced account of a battle without it skewing towards the victor, but then I heard the author is Jewish and he now lives in Israel (although he is of American descent). My thoughts were, how balanced can this account be? My fears were assuaged by the editorial reviews, and having read the book I can verify that it is as fair and balanced as possible, given the limitations placed on the author: namely, the lack of information forthcoming from the regimes that were on the losing side. I suppose this is understandable in the context of those governments - democracies like Israel (and the U.S.) declassify documents much sooner than other types of governments. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the leaderships of the losing countries are still in place - the Ba'ath Party in Syria, the industrio-military complex of Egypt, and the Hussein monarchy in Jordan.So, given that the account is scholarly and balanced, how does the book read? I was pleased to note that the author, Michael Oren, is an accomplished storyteller and the book mostly reads with all the spice and excitement of an early Tom Clancy novel. It flashes back and forth from the battlefield to the governments to the man on the street. More time must be spent on Israel, naturally enough, because the decisions were made by committees (when not made ad hoc on the battlefield). It takes some time to describe the arguments. In contrast, the facts that Egyptian decision-making structure was essentially non-existent, and that Jordan was an absolute monarchy, meant that there was little to report about internal politics in those countries. Oren is also adept at keeping an enormous cast of "characters" alive and in play - I never felt at a loss, even though this is the only book I've read on the conflict and was not even alive in 1967.This brings me two the first of my two criticisms of the book: there is not enough material on the actions of Syria and her government. Although Syria didn't do all that much fighting, they were certainly involved in both the diplomatic and military efforts. Even so, after having read the book I couldn't tell you the name of a single Syrian leader or general off the top of my head. This is is stark contrast to the amount of time spent in the Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Amman. The second shortcoming is the length of the narrative describing the diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis before the shooting started. Although necessary to fully describe the history of the conflict, did we really need to be told about every phone call between President Johnson and the Soviets? Every diplomatic overture from the U.N.? As such, pages 100-200 drag somewhat. We are ultimately rewarded by the quality of the narrative once the war begins, so ultimately it is worth the slog through the diplomacy.

It is no surprise that any book about events in the Middle East attracts vastly differing views in different reviews, especially when - as in this case - the author is a former official in the Israeli government. However, the critics of the book - who claim it is heavily pro-Israel - left me puzzled by the time I reached the end, as its detailed and clear accounts of events leave the reader with plenty of material with which to criticise the author's own country.Whether, for example, you think Israel was right or wrong to start the Six Days War, there is much in Oren's account to bolster your view, and if you start reading it without a clear view on the topic then neither does it bludgeon you into taking the same view as him.That is not to say the book is flawless, for which book is? In this case, the main blemish is the way the account in the book simply reports at face value much of the rhetoric from Arab leaders about wiping out Israel. How seriously such rhetoric should be taken - whether the comments indicate real intent or traditional phraseology aimed at winning popular support - is of course a continuing matter of heated debate. For the comments of this ilk made in the run up to the June 1967 war, Oren alas does not give much in the way of other evidence to help the reader judge them.Otherwise, for the Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian actions, Oren paints a nuanced picture of conflicting motives, disagreements amongst rulers and numerous shades of grey when it comes to judging their actions. The Syrians, by contrast, are the inscrutable, consistent villains of the piece. That is, however, in large part a side-effect of the absence of sources on the internal workings of the Syrian government, which means that the sorts of disagreements and tensions portrayed elsewhere are simply not known about when it comes to Syria.Yet where the book does have sources, it shines. Oren is particularly good at pointing out how the Egyptian and Jordanian governments ended up being fooled by their own propaganda, failing to seize early chances for a ceasefire or to make sensible military reactions because too many of their decision makers believed the stories of glorious victory being pumped out in their media when in fact they were suffering heavy defeats. Yet the difficulty of knowing what to do even if you have accurate information is poignantly reflected in the book's closing pages, which follow the key figures through later years. On the Israeli side, numerous figures were at various times in favour of strong military action and at others in favour of trading land and other major concessions for peace. There are some consistent hawks and doves, but for most either approach appealed at some point.The printed version of book has a slightly disappointing range of photographs and a rather complicated and unhelpful set of maps, particularly as they do little to portray the geographic features such as the heights of the Golan Heights, which are so important to understanding the political tensions and military actions. Other than that, it's a book I recommend highly.

A vast amount of detail from an academic historian, not quite the simplistic wonder story of most other books. Many set backs for both sides. A high price by both sides. Both sides improvising hour by hour. The War did not go according to the plans of either side, both trying to exploit the mistakes of the other, in this, one side did much better than the other. The outcome, almost by chance, could have been different, hour by hour, up to the last minute.

Having been in the Middle East at the time of the war it was interesting to learn what was really going on in the background. Especially as one could only get very limited news at the time.A very detailed book not possibly for the light reader.

Good read, not just the fighting but also the politics before, during and after the conflict.

bought this for my dad who is a voracious reader, but with visual difficulties at 89 years. He knew every page of the written book ,so loved the audio cds set of 15 in the box