Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare, 1939-1945

This is one of the best books I have read on electronic warfare in WW II. It covers the scientific and engineering efforts by Britain and and Germany to develop radio navigation systems, ground and airborne radar systems, and jamming systems. It also describes the efforts made by each country to determine what the other was doing. There is also some discussion of US and Japanese efforts in this electronic area.Another excellent book on electronic signals intelligence or SIGINT is "Most Secret War" by R. V. Jones (1978).

If you're a WW II buff this is THE book about the back and forth seesaw struggle between RAF Bomber Command and the Luftwaffe. It also covers the EW history in the Pacific between the US and Japanese forces. If you don't know about this period Dr. Price's book will be an eye-opener AND a great read!

A fascinating history of radar and its related technologies during WWII. This book concentrates primarily on British and German work, although there are a couple of chapters on US developments. There is some discussion of radar in Japan and none at all in the other belligerents like the Soviet Union and Italy.For a good discussion of US work during the same time period and after, see Robert Buideri's "The Invention That Changed the World".

Alfred Price, a career EW himself, wrote the original version of this work in 1967 when much of what he covers was still shrouded in official secrecy and myth. This book, revised twice since then, has stood the test of time and remains one of the great efforts on the subject of Electronic Warfare in the Second World War.The majority of the coverage is on the electronic war between England and Nazi Germany as they developed competing systems to aid their respective bombing campaigns and the countermeasures that arose in the form of improved aerial radars and passive reception devices. It's strengths include interviews with many of the participants in this obscure form of combat and the amount of information provided on the incredible array of devices and gadgets developed for electronic combat between 1939 and 1945.Although he does have several chapters covering US work and the Pacific War, these areas are better covered in the series he later wrote on US EW History for the Association of Old Crows. Over 60 years later the basics of EW really haven't changed, which makes this book still important reading for anyone interested in the dark arts of electronic warfare.

Ourstanding, detailed coverage of radar and radar jamming techniques used by alliedforces and German and Japanese units. The author makes clear the importance of these techniques in both offensive and defensive actions, especially in air combat .

I'm an engineer and found this book dull. The subject m,atter does interest me the book did not interest me.The actual events could have been described better. There was excitment but book wasn't very exciting.

Very insightful book from the weapons systems development, warfighter, and top leadership perspectives. Requires a simple, basic understanding of radio frequency (RF) fundamentals to pull the most out of the book. Wikipedia has a good primer on radar.

Om time. as advertised, Good read

Having noticed that R V Jones referred to this book frequently in his ‘Most Secret War’, I decided to get myself a copy. When originally written, Price was serving as an Electronic Warfare Officer on Britain’s V Force and much of the material it covered would still have been classified, happily although first published in 1967, it has since undergone several updates and this paperback edition was published in 2017.Even though the 1st recorded incidences of Electronic Warfare occurred during the American Civil War when the combatants tapped each other’s telegraph communications, it was really during the Second World War that Electronic Warfare came of age with both Germany and Britain in the forefront of Radar development as the war commenced. Price’s book tells this story and how measure and counter measure continually leap-frogged though by the end Britain and the US were, as Goering would admit, able to outpace the German efforts.Price did not have access to some of the material available to R V Jones but his story remains equally fascinating and excellent reliance is placed on the work of the author of the 1st edition’s preface, Dr Robert Cockburn of the Telecommunications Research Establishment. The book begins with the attempts in August 1939 of the Graf Zeppelin airship equipped as the world’s first airborne electronic intelligence, or Elint, collector, attempting to evaluate the RAF’s Radar system and comprehensively failing to do so not because it wasn’t there but because they made the error of thinking the British would use the same frequencies as the Germans for Radar, a mistake the British would benefit from and would themselves not make.In Britain, the likes of Cockburn and Jones were not as bound by paradigms as the Germans which allowed them to identify and successfully jam Knickebein ( which ‘surrendered almost without a fight’) X-Gerät and ϒ-Gerät in the Battle of the Beams in 1940/1. From the ‘Battle of the Beams’ and the piecing together of the operation of the Reich Air Defence system, covered by Jones, Price adds to the picture by going onto the offensive use of EW so here is told the story of the development of the Mandrel jammer, to screen RAF attacks, and its initial deployment in Boulton Paul Defiants. Indeed, that whole development of the RAF Bomber offensive electronic battle with the Luftwaffe is grippingly told.By the war’s end, each RAF heavy raid was a sophisticated and complex plan with Radar led Pathfinders, spoof raids by Mosquitos (usually identified as such by the Luftwaffe as the Mosquitos emitted no H2S transmission unlike the heavy bombers) and by Heavy Bombers, or even multiple heavy raids. During the raid, direct jamming by Mandrel carried within the bomber stream (often in B17s) would occur whilst engine noise from all bombers would be transmitted on German GCI frequencies via ‘Tinsel’ and same bombers would drop ‘Window’. Later ABC Lancasters of 101 Sqn would fly in raids with German speaking operators mimicking GCI controllers. As this was going on Serrate equipped Mosquito and Beaufighter night fighters would lurk in the stream homing on the transmissions of German night fighters to shoot them down. Navigation and bombing accuracy would outclass that of the 1940 Luftwaffe as the RAF developed and used Gee and Oboe.Of course, the Germans did take countermeasures to all this. Tactically the introduction of fighters into the bomber stream using Wilde Sau and then Zahme Sau to counter the effect of Window was effective, particularly when the Zahme Sau aircraft were fitted with ‘Naxos’ which ironically homed on the RAF bomber’s using ‘Monica’ fighter approach warning device! (when the RAF belatedly realised this when evaluating a captured Ju88, Harris insisted Monica was removed from all aircraft immediately. The RAF’s transmissions of jamming and radar emissions was often the cause of the death of the bomber crew as any transmission could be homed on and H2S allowed the tracking of the bomber stream even through ‘Window’. Nevertheless, Price’s evaluation is that ‘the various jamming methods reduced RAF bomber losses between December 1942 and the end of the war by something of the order of one per cent. Yet, over an extended period, that amounted to a saving of more than 1,000 bombers and their crews.’Whilst the RAF’s battle against the Luftwaffe forms the core of this book, the USAAF is not left out. Over Europe, there was obviously no point in trying to hide from fighters in daylight. Nevertheless, the problems of bombing accuracy through the North European overcast existed for the USAAF as it did for the RAF hence the adoption of H2S and its derivative H2X by the day bombers. Against Radar directed Flak ‘Window’, known as ‘Chaff’ by the Americans, was particularly effective. Price’s evaluation is that ‘When cloud or (over Japan) darkness forced AA gunners to rely on radar-controlled fire, jamming greatly reduced its accuracy. As a ‘ball park figure’, radio countermeasures probably saved about 600 US heavy bombers over Europe, and a further 200 during operations against Japan.’Price’s conclusion is that during the war there were 2 occasions when allied ECM (RCM in the terms of the day) brought about a near-collapse of an enemy air-defence system. ‘The first was the devastating initial effect of ‘Window’ on the German air defences at the end of July 1943. The second was over Japan in 1945, when the USAAF jamming paralysed the Japanese night-air-defence system. For the rest of the conflict radio-countermeasures brought about a somewhat smaller, though still significant, reduction in bomber losses.’ It is hard to disagree that the Allied radio-countermeasures effort during World War II was ‘a remarkably cost-effective investment.’This book is a fascinating read that I cannot recommend highly enough.

I really enjoyed this. The focus is largely on the electronics battle surrounding the Luftwaffe's and RAF's bomber offensives but there is some good coverage of EW activity in the Pacific too. The book is very even-handed, giving, for example, fulsome praise to the sophisticated air defence radars produced by Germany, even before the war had begun. German perceptions and perspectives are given appropriate attention. Particular highlights are the coverage of the decision-making behind the first deployment of Window and in-depth description of a major raid late in the war. The selection of photographs is also very good and worked well enough on my black and white Kindle. Did this book over-stay its welcome? No; had it been twice as long I still would have been kept absorbed. I have read a number of books on this niche subject and this is easily the best. And all for less than a pound! Who would particularly enjoy reading this? Anyone bound for an 'operational requirements' appointment in Defence.

This was a fascinating read, it covers the use of RADAR and jamming techniques employed by Britain, Germany,the US and Japan during WW2. Be warned their is a lot of technical information especially with regard to the operation of the various RADAR devices used and their Jamming, but that is needed for the reader to fully understand the Electronics battles that took place in the Skies over Europe and Japan in the Second World War. I have read a number of accounts of the Air war over Europe and in the Pacific, many first person written not long after the war. These rarely if ever mentioned the use of Electronic warfare in the Air campaigns and this book helped to fill many Gaps in my understanding. On a side note the Author also describes much of the Deception that also took place to protect British bomber streams over Europe to aid the Jamming and confuse the German Controllers as to the genuine targets. If you have any interest in Electronic warfare and its countermeasures I would recommend this book.

The 'Beams' were radio-location. The state of the art technology of using radio waves for navigation and detection during WW2. This essential book covers the early period uncovering the mysterious signals from enemy transmitters. All of these systems were designed to guide enemy planes in all weathers to targets over Britain. It goes on to discuss the development of centimetric radar technology. In the space of only six years, the technology changed from a series of rough blips on a static screen to a true 'picture' of the landmarks directly below a plane. It also covers the development of 'window', the tin foil strips that confused enemy radar. It's an engrossing and remarkable book, not lessened by the passage of time.

A history of electronic warfare in WW2, mostly between Britain and Germany, though there are well-researched chapters about American electronic warfare operations over Japan.Shows how opportunities to minimise casualties amongst RAF bomber command crews were missed for many months, possibly to preserve morale rather than lives. Also shows that contrary to popular belief, the Germans could be astonishingly inefficient in the way they organised their own air defences -they got better, but too late to do them any good.