On China

Prior to the publication of this book the definitive resource on China was Jonathan Spence's "In Search of Modern China". Spence the Yale Professor, is still indispensible to a modern understanding of this remarkable country. Now there is a second more up to date source and that is Henry Kissinger. The former Secretary of State who is now 88 years fortunately has taken the time to put together this incredible piece of work that only he could have created. The book demonstrates the necessity of having lived a very long productive life and generating wisdom capable of distilling his understanding of a country down to a 530 page volume of work. It is as good as any of his previous works (13 with this one) and for my money I now put this book in Kissinger's top three, along with WHITE HOUSE YEARS and DIPLOMACY. First the MECHANICS of the Book If you are going to read the hard copy as opposed to digital, you are in for a treat. The font is beautiful, and the paper used to print the volume is delicious. I say this because if you are a heavy reader; you really appreciate turning the pages of beautifully textured pages. I annotate all of my books, writing in margins, in the back on blank pages and just about everywhere, and I love writing on beautiful page that take the ink nicely. This book was crafted professionally as good as it gets. The ORGANIZATION of On China The Secretary has made 40 trips to China in his lifetime, enough that he should be the Honorary Ambassador to the country. He is thoroughly infused in the history of China, and he certainly does give you the history. There are 18 chapters plus an epilogue spread over 531 pages. There are 36 pages of footnotes and it is obvious that the Secretary had considerable organizational help with the footnotes which is to be expected. The first three chapters or 91 pages are devoted to the nation's history and Kissinger gets it right. I have made many trips to China, but I still have problems with the language. When you read any book on China, you will have problems with pronunciation. What I do is quickly scan the book writing down 50 or a 100 names or terms I can't pronounce, and then head for the first Chinese restaurant in town, and ask for help with the words. People love to help, especially when you are taking an interest in their culture and language. The guts of the book begins on page 91 or Chapter 4 which is Mao's Continuous Revolution. This chapter is superb and superbly written. If you study American China relations, the question that is always stipulated is whether or not America lost China in 1949. Kissinger correctly reminds us that China might never have been ours to lose, so we asking the wrong question. Mao always believed that the Confucian order had for thousands of years kept China a weak China. Confucius preached HARMONY, and Mao believed that progress could only come from brutal confrontations both in China and with outside adversaries for China to advance. Mao also believed that these confrontations would happen naturally, but if they did not, he was not beyond creating confrontations even if they had to be within the Communist party to kept progress going, as he understood progress. Chapter 6 which deals with China Confronts Both Superpowers is another section that only Kissinger could have written. It is here that China confronts the Soviet Union creating the Sino-Soviet split, and the United States with the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The chapter is riveting, and will affect and change your understanding of history. MY ANALYSIS The book is indispensible. You cannot understand China and modern Asia without having this book under your belt. One would have to be foolish to visit China and not read this book first to truly benefit from such a trip. Mao was famous for the Long March, and this book is a long journey for the reader but it is very rewarding. The Secretary takes us through the Road to Reconciliation in Chapter 8, and then the first encounters with Nixon, himself and the Chinese leadership in Chapter 9. It is a fascinating portrayal of power meeting power head to head, and the respect that even enemies can hold for each other. It is now generally accepted that only Nixon the hardened right winger could have opened the door to China and brought the American people along with him, because he Nixon was viewed as tough. Perhaps in a decade or two, Harvard will accept what most historians have already accepted. In Chapter 11 we witness the End of the Mao Era. Zhou Enlai falls and Deng's first return to power begins. Kissinger loves writing about Deng and calls him the indestructible Deng throughout chapter 12. Keep in mind that it was Deng who opened up modern China and began the reforms that were necessary for China to assert itself years later internationally and economically. For those readers that know very little of China, this book is a whirlwind tour of a country fast gaining hegemony over Asia. You need to read Chapter 13 on the Third Viet Nam to understand how China is capable of dealing with its neighbors. Had we handled Viet Nam this way, the outcome and history would have been different. CONCLUSION: Henry Kissinger ON CHINA is destined to become a best seller and in the process will greatly help an America that knows very little about China except for newspapers, to understand not just the history of this vital country, but its future and the nexus of that future with America's future. No one can ignore China, so the sooner we as Americans gain the understanding that we need to make intelligent decisions, the better off we will all be. If you have an interest in China whatsoever, run to read this book, and do not put it down until you are finished with it. Good luck and thank you for reading this review. Richard C. Stoyeck ASSIDE: I will share something extraordinary with you. When you read a book like this, you will have a better understanding of China than 98% of the people living in China and 95% of the Chinese people living in America. I am still shocked when I meet Chinese people in this country young and old who have next to no understanding of Chinese history prior to Mao. They do not know the name Sun Yat-sen, or even Zhou Enlai, and forget about the Cultural Revolution unless they lived through it. Even the tragedy of Tiananmen Square is fast fading from memory. It reminds me of German history in the post Hitler period. Anybody in Germany who was educated post 1950 has very little to no understanding of the Hitler period. It is simply glossed over as a dark period in German history; the teachers do not know what to say. Just amazing.

Whether one admires Dr. Henry Kissinger or not, it cannot be denied the man was THERE and knew all the major actors on the world geopolitical stage for the past forty plus years. His very brief history of China's four thousand year history as a tumultuous state, indeed as the land that created "statehood" as it is traditionally understood, quickly gives way to a slightly more detailed summary of 19th century European colonialism in China. A people that have long seen themselves as living in "The Middle Kingdom" (or, as Kissinger explains, the center of the world, even the universe) depended on psychological and cultural superiority to absorb and transform their foreign opponents to Chinese ways of thought and action rather than through use of martial force. Kissinger quickly moves into the post- World War II era and the victory in 1949 of Mao Zedong's communist forces in the Chinese civil war. He details the reasons for China's intervention against US led U.N. forces during the Korean Conflict, moves on to Mao's break with the Soviet Union over his perception of Stalin's paternalistic and neo-colonial attitude toward a then weak China. He catalogs the missteps of Mao's leadership, including "The Great Leap Forward" - agrarian reform that lead to famine - and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's which purged Mao's perceived opponents as well as so called revisionists, reactionaries, Confucians, intellectuals, military leaders, educators, bureaucrats, and any other "enemies of the state" perceived by the youthful cadres of the Red Guard; ultimately, those who rounded up these enemies were themselves rounded up and sent for "re-education" to collective farms or factory floors for years. "On China" became most interesting to me when Kissinger describes the difficulty and finesse entailed in the opening of US-China contact, culminating with President Nixon's 1972 visit to the People's Republic and his meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong. Kissinger shares great insights into the personalities of these two men who partnered for more than forty years and guided China through tumultuous transformation. China's next leader, Deng Xioping, can perhaps be viewed as that country's modern day savior, the man who paved the way for market reform through his clear eyed, common sense approach to what was necessary to modernize the Chinese economy. This, of course, has led to China's ascendancy as an economic superpower which may one day eclipse all others. But with over 100 million people still living below the poverty line and an aging population of over 1.2 billion, China will be long beset by problems without easy solutions. Kissinger explains our relationship with the PRC from Presidents Nixon through Obama. He has often been an invited guest to China for forty years, making his insight and analysis current, intelligent, and compelling. Of course, he is only one man and imperfect as all men. But I hope those who lead our country in the future read this book as well as other works by Dr. Kissinger because his analysis of future trends in Sino-US relations may bear the fruit grown from his experience and wisdom. He describes pitfalls to be avoided, especially economic and military confrontation, as well paths of cooperation to be followed. I thoroughly enjoyed and learned a great deal from this book written by one of America's greatest elder statesmen.

This is an excellent book for our Americans to understand the Chinese international policy and behaviors in recent years. It details the philosophy of the Chinese from the latest 500 years of Chinese history. It also explains that reasons caused the hatred between Japanese and Chinese. Be very careful to understand the tricks that Japanese is playing now in the Pacific area, very similar to what the did before the second world war. We need to watch the growth of Japanese military power instead of the Chinese power because the bad tracking record of the Japanese invasion to the Pearl Harbor that killed the world peace and destroyed the power balance in Asia. It also describes the importance of a well maintained relationship among America and China for world peace. A good relationship not tension between US and China in eastern Pacific area is a better policy to keep a peaceful environment in Asia.

I have decided to buy this book by Dr. Henry Kissinger to whom, I believe, is a always a friend of China. This is not a review but to state the truth about China and the Chinese people! China today stands at the crossroad and is ready to make friends with everybody provided it is respected in turn. In the past, the West has not understood China and always treat it with disrespect and worst still with full hostility and animosity and still is...! China has a continuous historical civilization of more than four thousand years. Although the regime change is quite rapid but the Chinese themselves are confident in facing the world today. The Chinese in China and all over the world have collectively learn a painful lesson in the past by not knowing well their origins, their history, their culture and their unique civilization. But these are going to change as more Chinese understand and support China and even its present government and political concept. Time will tell whether the present political system will survive. But one thing is for sure, we the Chinese people today stand proud and tall and ready to meet any challenge from within and without! We are proud of our civilization and our culture which have even been copied and adapted by other countries - notably its ancient system of government and military strategies, its martial arts systems, its written language, its poetry and art, food and drinks and calligraphy and even its fantastic literature which have been translated into many foreign languages. China and the Chinese people will continue to evolve socially, politically and militarily. The fact that China has reached the superpower status is due to the determination, innovativeness and going back to study its historical concepts to be ready to advance economically and militarily into the future. Chinese people have these following concepts handed down through history...loyalty, dedication, determination and defense of the nation. Never again will our nation be weak, divided nor allowed ways for it to be invaded. We are able and capable of defending our nation but we will not be a "threat" nor be a "hegemon" to any other nations. We will treat each country as equal and all we ask is for them not to interfere in our internal affairs nor remain hostile nor gang up on us. We stand in solidarity to support our nation through thick and thin and through learning from the past painful history of factionism and division. These negative factors will not happen again. Finally, the sun will never, never set on our our people, our nation called Zhong Kuo or Middle Kingdom (known in the West as China). We hope other people will respect us as we would respect them in return and we have a long memory in remembering who are definitely our friends and who are our foes...! Hence, we regard Dr. Henry Kissinger and President Nixon as our dear friends for opening up China to the world. Need I, a proud Chinese, say more??? Thanks and this is my two-cent worth of personal opinion on my ancestral homeland of CHINA.....Cheers!

To get the most out of Henry Kissinger's "On China" one should read Jonathan Spence's The Search for Modern China in order to understand the Chinese culture, frame of reference, and history that lead up to modern China. What Kissinger provides absolutely brilliantly was his personal experience and witness of China's modern foreign policy and market based economy unfold. Kissinger does provide a condensed historical and cultural summary to "catch up" to post WWII China, but he assumes the reader knows something of China's history and culture so as not to dwell on it for more than 2 chapters. The key figure was not so much Mao Zedong, the fascinating self appointed, delusional philosopher-ruler, but Deng Xiaoping who is the Chinese leader most responsible for China's emergence into a modern, superpower, both economically and geopolitically. Under Deng, China was our secret partner in our "Grand Strategy" (first developed in 1947 by the great State Department thinker and planner, George F. Kennan) to contain the USSR, under the Marshall Plan. Deng redefined the Chinese economy, where competence and decentralization accompanied by accountability, replaced failed central planning with which (ironically) our current administration seems to be toying without realizing that even China's senior leaders know pragmatically that it doesn't work. On the geopolitical front, I learned from Kissinger's book that Deng secretly informed the US before it invaded Northern Vietnam to stop them from consolidating Laos and Cambodia into the traditional Indochinese configuration, but under a North Vietnamese hegemony as a USSR military and economic satellite. Deng made a massive military assault on Vietnam's northern boarder, but then stopped after it took and held 12 miles deep along its boarder with Vietnam, which roughly corresponded to China's traditional Southern boarder under the "Central Kingdoms". This forced Vietnam to set up an opposing force to monitor the Chinese build up on its Northern flank, instead of invading Laos and Cambodia. In fact, the USSR canceled, out of frustrated resignation, it's military aid to North Vietnam, and Vietnam withdrew from Laos and Cambodia. What is significant is that Deng sought and obtained the tacit approval of the United States in advance that was kept secret for decades. Kissinger's book is full of examples like this. Even the confrontation over Taiwan and the straits separating Taiwan and China was mostly for show to order to keep the 7th Fleet pinned to that region and have the effect of offsetting Soviet influence. It was astonishing, but geopolitically understandable, that when China took artillery pot shots at some of Taiwan's minor islands, it did so at predictable times, so that no one would get hurt, but the US would be sufficiently alarmed to keep up its military presence there. In a way, China taught us the complex geopolitical game of "Go", a Chinese board game of encirclement" that when well played, is far more complex than Russian chess and reflects China's long obsession with Sun Tzu "Art of War". If we had had the relationship with China that Kissinger began during the Nixon Administration before and during the Korean War, it would have been either averted or shortened by 2 years. In fact, China would not have given North Vietnam permission to invade South Korea. Our reaction through the so-called "Truman Doctrine" was totally unforeseen. Had we made it "foreseeable" like the anticipatory moves of the game of "Go", there would have been perhaps a lot of saber rattling, but North Korean would not have attempted this adventure. It should be noted that China so misunderstood the US's intentions, that it was preparing to invade Taiwan simultaneously, which was stopped in its tracks by Truman's deployment of the 7th fleet in the Sea of China. It should be noted that China was the reluctant and suspicious ally of Stalin's USSR, only to learn how duplicitous and self serving Stain was and how honorable and reliable the US was by comparison. All these amazing insights are thanks to Kissinger's remarkable book that I shall always treasure in our library. What Kissinger only hints at by quoting cryptic comments from Deng and his successors, which I know from talking to senior Chinese leaders, is that the decline of the US is not in the interest of China because it would be destabilizing to world (military and economic) peace, and China, like Singapore and many SE Asian nations deplore it. As long ad the US deploys its own blood and treasure, China is only too happy to see the US as an ad hoc, itinerant intentional police force, as long as the US retreats or stops in its tracks, as the Chinese did on Vietnam's Northern boarder. It is important to note that Kissinger is a witness, and refrains from gratuitous opinion, but the lessons of history are clear. Alain Palmieri, 4/28/2012, NY and NH.

This is a splendid book and in particular it will fascinate those of us old enough to remember Kissinger's « peace is at hand » speech in the Fall of 1972, hinting that the Vietnam war could soon be over as Nixon, basking in the glory of his recent trip to China, was about to be reelected in a landslide, which would eventually precipitate him in the snakepit of Watergate and cause his downfall about a year later. The chronological sequence chosen by the author is sometimes a bit heavy but all the chapters are extremely interesting and the general reader who does not claim to be a specialist of China related topics - this unquestionably applies to this reviewer.... - will learn a lot and enjoy a solid, well written account of China's relation to the West since the days of the first Macartney mission. The pages devoted to Kissinger's relationship to Zhou Enlai are fascinating and so are the chapters describing the tense relationship with North Vietnam, eventually resulting in what could be called a war some years later. As most Amazon reviewers have been rightly full of praise for Dr. Kissinger's book, there is hardly a need to add anything in this respect, so let me deal with the criticism that has been offered here and there. Kissinger's book - like his memoirs - would be "self-serving". Such indeed is the hatred that Nixon and Kissinger still generate in some circles - be they American liberals of the old breed or America-hating Europeans - that in desperation for lack of any other possible criticism, they resort to the worn out argument "it's a waste of time to read it, the guy keeps blowing his own trumpet". With all due respect to fellow reviewers, this verges on being insipid baloney: for one thing, most of the book is devoted to times when Kissinger was either not born, in college, not yet in office or out of it, so his prose could hardly be "self-serving" in this respect. As to the chapters he personally lived through - the China visit, the subsequent relations with Mao's China and then Deng's - well, of course it is probably a bit self-serving as all personal accounts of historical events have been since the days of Xenophon and Julius Cesar ! Kissinger never pretends he saved the world and compared to Winston Churchill's memoirs for instance, his book is a model of objectivity ! In short, a splendid, intelligent, well researched and highly readable account of fascinating times in history.

I would recommend this book who wants to read about Chinese history, particularly that from about 1940 until the present day. A word of caution however, it would be best to have some knowledge of the Cold War and some education about Marxist-Leninism and perhaps some knowledge of the early history of the rise of communism in it's early days in Chinese history. Also some previous knowledge of the of the communist and nationalist war would be helpful to the reader. Such a background may be of help in better understanding parts of Dr. Kissinger's book and may make for a faster read. I found this book to be a great reminder to me of the historical events which occurred in the Soviet-USA Cold War period while educating me about the specifics of what was going on in China during the same period which was largely ignored by the press in favor of Soviet issues. Thus most of us who grew up during the Cold War could benefit from reading this book. The first time I had heard much of China was when the Chinese crossed into North Korea and my dad came rushing into our house to tell us about it. But of course back in the 1950's and 1960's the Soviets had a better chance of destroying the world than the Chinese with their limited military. So for me the insider knowledge that Kissinger had about China and particularly the secret negotiations that occurred between the US government and China stretching back to the Vietnam years was most interesting. Kissinger does a good job of portraying the personalities of Mao, Chou, and Nixon during this period especially by including actual conversations between these three people and himself. It was also interesting to hear about the opening of the Sino-American relationship and the fear that China had of the Soviets which, at least in Kissinger's view, was the prime reason for the Chinese to seek out support at least psychologically from the US. I also never knew that the Chinese feared encirclement from the Soviets, other Asian countries including Vietnam and of course from US strategy. I think however that Kissinger became somewhat carried away with explaining things over and over again between some chapters of the book. Also the early history of China, while interesting, lacked much detail which I suppose would be better left to books devoted to those periods but it did help in explaining China's feeling of being the only country under heaven that could be the center of the world. What will happen next in the history of the world is of course anyone's guess but the specter of the rising China I believe will be the major issue on the plate of the US for many years to come.

In "On China", former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger paints a broad picture of Chinese history, from the three kingdoms period through to the voyage of British agent McCartney, the Boxer rebellion, the cultural revolution and the current day. The greatest focus is on the opening up of relations and the second half of the text could almost be called "History of Kissinger-China relations", but that does reflect Kissinger's important historical role. Early in the book, to demonstrate the differences between Chinese and western strategic thinking, Kissinger compares chess to wei qi, known in the west by its Japanese name "Go". Chinese strategic thinking, as stressed in the writings of Sun Tzu, does not stress absolute mastery, which is the name of the game in chess. Chess is a game with a clear victor and a clear winner, where total domination of the other player is the key. It ends when the opposing king meets the grim reaper. By contrast, wei qi is a game of subtle victories, with a lot of close matches where a game has a slight winner, but barely. In addition, the strategic priority in chess is to gain control of territory with the pieces already on board -- everything is explicit. In wei qi, which translates as "game of surrounding pieces", strategy is to be found in the pieces not yet placed on the board. Chess matches begin with a struggle for control of the center of the board and for the elimination of enemy pieces in head-on clashes; Wei Qi players move into empty pieces to mitigate the strategic potential of their adversaries. Quoting Kissinger "Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility." This leads into Kissinger's analysis of historical Chinese geopolitical strategy. Tradition in China was to rarely directly militarily engage enemies, instead preferring subterfuge. The strongest army was the army that never needed to fight. The strategy with respect to the barbarians surrounding China was to play "barbarian against barbarian", a narrative Kissinger implied continues through to the present day. Playing barbarian against barbarian was a strategy that worked for China due to its historical position of strength. Its emperor was ruler of "all under heaven" and trade with other countries was contextualized in terms of tribute to the emperor - an ideology which meant an absence of trade with Japan. This strategy would near its end with increasing trade with the west, particularly Britain. China viewed Britain as a "far barbarian", an offense to Britain. Britain was not allowed an embassy in China as horizontal state to state relations would be an offense to Chinese state ideology. Trade with China was limited to a single port. After the opium wars (opium being the one western import that was immensely successful in the Chinese market), trade with China was expanded to six ports, and embassies were allowed. Not wanting to give advantage to Britain, they gave the same deal to other imperial powers hoping to spur competition. The Chinese court concluded that playing barbarian against barbarian was the wise choice, and that they should play France and America against Britain. However, they had no real means to make that happen. What would follow was a "century of humiliation", including the Boxer rebellion and the occupation of Manchuria, whereby China was consistently subject to the will of foreign powers. There were individuals in the Chinese court pleading change, but conservative forces would consistently win out. Plans for military and technological catch-up to the west were rejected on the basis that "China would no longer be China". At some point, I'd like to better understand why China fell prey to conservatives and oligarchy whereas Japan underwent the Meiji restoration and industrialized? This is not explained by Kissinger. As I read the anecdtoes of the incompetence of 19th century Chinese leadership, I could not help but think of the current American leadership, whose priority is to maintain oligarchy at all costs, even at the expense of the future. The ongoing humiliation of China, the boxer rebellion, the carving up of Chinese territory by Russia and Japan could only end in the complete eradication of the previous Chinese ruling class, and the rise of Mao Zedong (Kissinger's preferred spelling). Kissinger speaks approvingly of Mao, and all of his major actions except for the cultural revolution are spoken of with praise. All three of China's major wars since Mao: The Korean war, the Sino-Indian war, and the third Vietnam war, are portrayed as Chinese victories. In the Korean war, China shocked the world by entering the conflict, and achieved its goal of creating a Korean buffer state and not having Western troops on its border, of falling victim to the wei qi strategy of encirclement. In the Sino-Indian war, Kissinger spoke approvingly of how Mao was motivated by a previous conflict ~1000 years prior, when China deterred future Indian aggression. It would take over territory and give it back, and give back captured weapons, a successful move of preemptive deterrence, and since that time India has not dared attack China. Interesting is the third Vietnam war (France and United States made up the first two). As recently as 1973, China and Vietnam had been allied, but the exit of the USA changed geopolitical considerations in the area. Vietnam, a historic Chinese vassal state, wanted to reunite all of Indochina, such an empire of ~100 million people under Ho Chi Minh would challenge regional Chinese hegemony. It signed a mutual defense treaty with Moscow in 1978 or so, and China saw the risk of being encircled, a la wei qi. As such, in a move of aggressive deterrence, it invaded Vietnam, wiped out enemy forces at huge cost to its own forces, and then pulled out. Vietnam no longer had the means to create a united Indochina, and a mockery was made of the Soviet Union, who failed to live up to their treaty obligations. Surprisingly, this obvious victory for China is one that Kissinger states was perceived as a failure by the western media and strategic analysts at the time. Why? Kissinger laments the fact that the best alternative to keep Vietnam out of Cambodia was to align with the "execrable" Pol Pot. The rise of the Sino-American alliance is presented in the book as being primarily a consequence of Soviet antagonism. China was recruiting the far barbarian (United States) to help fight the near barbarian (Soviet Union). Sino-soviet relations began to sour in the Korean war, where Mao was upset at the lack of Soviet assistance. There were also frequent border clashes in China's north. Over time, Chinese propaganda began referring to the USSR as "revisionist" rather than "communist" or "socialist". Kissinger does ask why rapprochement did not happen earlier. In the 1950s, it was impossible on the part of the USA because state department thinkers were embroiled in the debate of "who lost China", referring to the nationalist defeat at the hands of the communists. This led to soviet experts taking over the positions of intelligence command. In the 1960s, China was torn apart by the internal instability of the cultural revolution, an impact that Kissinger compares to the effect the second Vietnam war had on the sociology of the USA. Once both countries had settled down, and the issue of Soviet intimidation became to serious to ignore, the case for rapprochement became stronger and stronger. Kissinger also claims that Mao was hedging because he thought the Vietnam protests in the USA could unleash a revolution there -- this sounds hard to believe. It is also claimed he equated the timelines between 1918-1939 and 1945-1968, and thought another convulsion was around the corner. I didn't pay as much attention in the sections dealing with 80s, 90s and early 2000s as I found them kind of dull. There was some brief discussion about the Chinese shock with respect to the negative world reaction following Tienanmen square, they didn't get why the rest of the planet cared. Had I been more informed I might have been more captivated by the commentary that China is returning to Confucian values, rather than its post-revolutionary Marxist-Maoist ideological structure. Forwarding to the future, Kissinger asks if China-US relations are under the same framework as Britain-Germany relations of 100 years prior. He brings up the Crowe memorandum of 1907, which concluded that Berlin-London antagonisms were inevitable and independent of behaviors and beliefs of their leaders. Kissinger realizes this may be the case but urges a different future. He points out that whereas European leaders in 1914 were unaware of the destructive potential of their weapons, the same is not true of current leaders and nuclear weapons. He urges the creation of a pacific community, much like the post-war atlantic community, so that Sino-US relations can be moved through the prism of a shared future rather than a competition. I wonder if he really means to endorse global government. It's a nice picture, but it seems all of these politics end with a rosy epilogue showcasing a vision of a possible bright future. In an interview on TV I saw of Kissinger with respect to this book, he said that the concept of "China's rise", was a mislabel. China, he said, believes it has always been at the apex of civilization, and the period 1800-2000 or so is merely an exception to the historic norm. That is the impression I get from his text, and of Kissinger's view of China.

The book covers a huge historical period. It is true, however, that the first of a total of eighteen chapters plus an epilogue covers a period of millenia. It commences with the unification of China in the 3rd century B.C. and ends in the 19th century, a period of humiliation for China with incursions, depredations, and its semicolonization by the Western powers. The aim of this first chapter is to familiarize the reader with China's Confucian culture, its approach to Diplomacy and its conception of the Art of War. The balance of the book covers the remaining period to the present year. This latter period includes the very period of its humiliation including the notorious opium war, the 22 year civil war which ended with communism prevailing in 1949;the Mao era and the turbulent sixties with the Great Leap Forward which left in its wake 20 million Chinese dead from famine, the Cultural Revolution which nearly ruined China and forced Mao to reverse it. But it also describes the unprecedented growth under Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese leaders that followed him rendering China an Economic Superpower. The credentials of the author for writing the book are impeccable:the book was written 40 years after the author's first high level mission to China at the behest of president Nixon in 1971 and following 50 additional travels and discussions with four generations of Chinese leaders in the interval. The book aims, partly drawing on the discussions with Chinese leaders as primary source, to explain the conceptual way the Chinese think about problems of peace and war and international order, and its relationship to the more pragmatic American way. American exceptionalism is missionary. It holds that the United States has an obligation to spread its values to every part of the world. China's exceptionalism is cultural. China does not proselytize;it does not claim that its contemporary institutions are relevant outside China. But it is heir to the Middle kingdom tradition, which formally graded all other states as various levels of tributaries based on their approximation to Chinese cultural and political forms;in other words, a kind of cultural universality. At the time when Buddhism appeared in Indian culture stressing contemplation and inner peace, and monotheism was proclaimed by the Jewish - and, later, Christian and Islamic - prophets with an evocation of a life after death, China produced no religious themes in the Western sense at all. The Chinese never created a myth of cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese themselves, whose values, even when declared of universal applicability, were conceived of as Chinese in origin. The predominant values of Chinese society were derived from the prescriptions of Confucius (551-479 B.C.). Confucius was concerned with the cultivation of social harmony. His themes were the principles of compassionate rule, the performance of correct rituals, and the inculcation of filial piety. The Confucius canon would evolve into something akin to China's Bible and constitution combined. Its maxim the harmonius society. Confucius preached a hierarchical social order. Oriented toward this world, his thinking affirmed a code of social conduct, not a roadmap to the after-life. At the pinnacle of the Chinese order stood the Emperor, a figure with no parallel in the Western experience. He combined the spiritual as well as the secular claims of the social order. The empire was administered by high literate bureaucracy selected following national examination. In Diplomacy rarely did the Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash;elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces, the Chinese ideal sressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage. China's most enduring game is wei qi. Wei qi translates as 'game of surrounding pieces;it implies a concept of strategic encirclement. Chess on the other hand, is about total victory. The purpose of the game is checkmate, to put the opposing king into a position where he cannot move without being destroyed. A similar contrast exists in the case of China's distictive military theory. Chinese thinkers developed stragetic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict. The seminal figure in this tradition is known to history as Sun Tzu, author of the famed treatise 'The Art of War'. What distinguishes Sun Tzu from Western writers on strategy is the emphasis on the psychological and political elements over the purely military. Where Western strategists reflect on the means to assemble superior power at the decisive point, Sun Tzu addresses the means of building dominant political and psychological position, such that the outcome becomes a foregone conclusion. The author is incisive in describing the personalities of Chinese leaders including Mao's and Zhou's:'The difference between the leaders was reflected in their personalities. Mao dominated any gathering;Zhu suffused it. Mao's passion strove to overwhelm opposition;Zhou's intellect would seek to persuade or outmaneuver it. Mao was sardonic;Zhou penetrating. Mao thought himself as a philosopher;Zhou saw his role as an administrator or negotiator;Mao was eager to accelerate history;Zhou was content to exploit its currents. A saying he often repeated was 'The helmsman must ride the waves.' When they were together there was no question of the hierarchy, not only in the formal sense but in the deepest aspect of Zhou's extraordinary deferential conduct.' And then we come to Deng. Mao destroyed China and left its rubles as building blocks for ultimate modernization. Deng was the builder. The China of today - with the world's second-largest economy and largest volume of foreign exchange reserves, and with multiple cities boasting skyscrapers taller than the Empire State building - is testimonial to Deng's vision, tenacity, and common sense. Mao had governed as a traditional emperor of a majestic and awe-inspiring kind. He embodied the myth of the imperial ruler supplying the link between heaven and earth and closer to the divine than the terrestrial. Deng governed in the spirit of another Chinese tradition:basing omnipotence on the ubiquitousness but also the invisibility of the ruler. Mao had governed by counting on the endurance of the Chinese people to sustain the suffering his personal vision would impose on them. Deng governed by liberating the creativeness of the Chinese people to living above their own vision of the future. In the epilogue the author outlines possible scenarios in the relationship between USA and China: The conflict scenario: The United States is more focused on overwhelming military power, China on decisive psychological impact. Sooner or later, one side or the other would miscalculate. The above scenario is countered by China's demographics and the capability of modern military technology. Another scenario is that the crucial competition between the United States and China is more likely to be economic and social than military. The author concludes appropriately the book with a wish:that the United States and China could merge their efforts to build the world.

There is no better analysis on China than this book. And it puts world peace in prospective, even now ten years after it was written

Kissenger es genial en su forma de abordar un tema tan complejo y su lírica es accesible y comprensible, la forma en que la va abordando los temas no deja cabos sueltos y aunque por momentos -sobre todo en la época de Nixon- se va por las ramas, en realidad es un texto muy concreto que toca los temas mas importantes sobre este fascinante país llamado China.

From the start to 2000s. Even though China has changes recently, it is still a great book to learn about how China got to where it is today. This book break through the mist about china and gets straight to the point. I highly recommend reading this book with an open mind.

Pela ótima introdução e motivos que é demonstrada hoje em dia, sobre o porque os comunistas chineses atualmente. For the great introduction and reasons that is demonstrated nowadays, on why the Chinese communists nowadays.